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Abstract. Model-Driven Security (MDS) has emerged as a promising
sound methodology for supporting the development of secure systems
nowadays. Following the advances in MDS, this research work aims at 1)
developing new modeling techniques to represent multiple security con-
cerns, 2) (automatically) composing security models with the business
logic model (called target model), and 3) testing the security model com-
position and the resulting secure system against security requirements.
These three objectives converge to an integrated MDS framework (and
tool chain) which 1) allows a target system model to embed various
security concerns, 2) enables the generation of implementation code in-
cluding configured security infrastructures, and 3) makes these security
properties testable by construction. This paper presents the main re-
search modules, the results we have achieved so far, and the main points
for future work.
Keywords: Model-Driven Security, Model-Driven Engineering, Secu-
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1 Introduction
It is undoubted that the role of security engineering is getting more impor-
tant than ever as our world is becoming more digital and networked. However,
the traditional software development process has shown the inefficiency in fac-
ing with the following three main challenges for nowadays security engineering.
First, (software) systems are getting more and more complex. Especially, tak-
ing into account security concerns while developing (already complex) systems
makes the development process more stressful, error-prone and difficult. Second,
security threats are getting more dangerous, varied, and changing quickly. These
make security requirements more complex, difficult to deal with. Security fea-
tures are often scattered and tangled throughout the entire system. It is hard
to integrate them properly into the traditional development process. However,
they are rarely taken into account at early stages of the development processes
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[2]. In other words, the overall system design often misses the cautious engi-
neering of security. Third, even though the complexity of systems (especially
including security concerns) that have to be produced and maintained is con-
tinuously increasing, economic pressure reduces development time and increases
the frequency of modifications are made. All these issues constantly require more
productive and flexible security engineering methods for better supporting the
development and maintenance of reliable secure systems.
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) has been considered by some researcher
[1] as a solution to the handling of complex and evolving software systems.
As a specialization of MDE, Model-Driven Security (MDS) aims at providing
means to tackle the complexity and increase the productivity in modern secure
systems development. MDS enables security models more productive, i.e., mod-
els could be manipulated automatically in every development stage. The three
main challenges mentioned above could be solved by MDS [5]. However, there
are weaknesses of the MDS state of the art. Our recent systematic review of MDS
[5] shows that more MDS work is needed to deal with multiple security concerns
at the same time. Moreover, not many MDS approaches have fully leveraged
the Aspect-Oriented Modeling (AOM) techniques to specify multiple security
concerns and enhance the modularity of secure systems. There is also lack of a
complete tool chain (based on model transformations) to automate the derivation
from MDS models to code. Following the advances in MDS, this research work
aims at 1) developing new (AOM) modeling techniques to represent multiple se-
curity concerns, 2) (automatically) composing security models with the business
logic model (called target model), and 3) testing the security model composi-
tion and the resulting secure system against security requirements. These three
objectives converge to an integrated MDS framework (and tool chain) which 1)
allows a target system model to embed various security concerns, 2) enables the
generation of implementation code including configured security infrastructures,
and 3) makes these security properties testable by construction.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
main objectives, and the main (expected) contributions of our proposed research.
It is followed by Section 3 that shows our main research modules, and track
record of the archived results so far and what missing. Finally, the conclusion
and future work are presented in Section 4.
2 Objectives
2.1 Research Objectives
There are three main research objectives in this work. First. we aim at proposing
a portfolio of well-defined security models without any consideration of a target
model i.e., the model in which the security models will be inserted or composed.
Consequently, each security concern will be modeled in isolation leading to a
better understanding and modularization of these security concerns.
Second, we propose to automatically compose a subset of selected security
models with the target system model to obtain a new model of the system
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augmented of security properties. This model composition can be performed
using model transformations or model composers. Once various security models
specified, the automation of the composition should allow to adapt more easily
the target model to different situations by allowing the automated composition
of appropriate security models. Moreover, the model of the systems augmented
of security properties can be used for formal analyze of security properties.
Third, we propose to exploit the model composition operators to make the
final implementation testable by construction. Composing security models (view-
points) into the target model will lead to a more detailed model, which will finally
be implemented. The code production is error prone and the conformance of the
implementation with the security policy must be tested. The composition oper-
ators we propose may offer an elegant way 1) to make the implemented security
mechanisms testable, in the sense they can be made observable at runtime, 2) to
propose a security fault model to perform mutation analysis on the final code.
2.2 Expected Contributions
From our proposed approach, the main expected contributions of our work are as
follows: 1) a library of security concerns and a set of Domain Specific Languages
(DSLs) for specifying these security concerns; 2) a model-driven framework for
composing security models (conforming to these DSLs) with the target model;
and 3) a mutation analysis approach for testing the resulting secure systems.
3 Research Modules & Track Record
This section shows the four main modules of our research, with the results that
have been achieved so far, and the approach on how to complete the thesis.
3.1 Literature Review of Model-Driven Security
This module focuses on the state-of-the-art of MDS and the key aspects of our
project, i.e. modeling, composing, and testing of security concerns. Because we
realized that there was not any real systematic review of MDS, we conducted
one whose results are presented in [5]. The results show not only a clear picture
of current main approaches in MDS but also the current status of key aspects
in MDS.
The results suggest that more attention should be paid for dealing with
multiple security concerns at the same time. Most current approaches only deal
with solely one security concern, especially authorization. Besides, there are
significantly less MDS papers tackling integrity, availability, and authentication
than authorization and confidentiality. An important remark is that more work
should be done to have (DSLs) models with well-defined semantics of various
security concerns. These models must be extensively, formally defined in order to
enable the integration with automated analysis tools (based on well-established
formal methods) and/or program synthesis tools. On the other hand, a tool
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chain (based on model transformations) to derive from models (to models, then)
to implementation code is also an important piece of future work. Regarding
modeling approaches, there are very few selected papers propose a full AOM
approach that security concerns are specified as aspects and eventually woven
into the primary model(s). Last but not least, there is a lack of empirical studies
for MDS approaches so more empirical studies should be conducted.
The details of five main MDS approaches have been discussed in our book
chapter, namely Advances in MDS [4]. Moreover, we are working on extending
[5] for submission to a journal.
3.2 Modeling Security Concerns
As discussed in [5], domain specific languages (DSLs) could be defined for speci-
fying security concerns. We aim at proposing a set of DSLs which specialized for
capturing well-defined semantics of various security concerns. These DSLs are
used for creating well-specified security models without any consideration of a
target model i.e., the model in which the security models will be inserted or com-
posed. Currently, we are trying to introduce these DSLs in a full AOM approach,
e.g. using Reusable Aspect Model [3]. Consequently, each security concern will
be modeled in isolation leading to a better understanding and modularization
of these security concerns.
As the first approach, we focused on dealing with the authorization prob-
lem, especially access control (role-based access control, RBAC) and delegation.
In [6], it has been shown that various RBAC-based delegation features can be
specified using our metamodel (DSL). Our DSL supports complex delegation
characteristics like temporary, recurrence delegation, transfer delegation, multi-
ple and multi-step delegation, etc. On the other hand, the business logic (base
system) can be specified using another DSL, e.g. an architecture (component-
based) metamodel [6]. In the next step, we target to deal with multiple security
concerns at the same time in a full AOM approach.
3.3 Composing Security Models with the Target System
In the modeling module of our approach, security concerns are modeled indepen-
dently with business logic. In this module, security models have to be composed
with the target system model to obtain a new model of the system augmented
of security properties. Fig. 1 presents an overview of our extensive model-driven
approach for access control and delegation management [6], [7]. In our approach,
delegation is considered as a “meta-level” mechanism which impacts the exist-
ing access control policies, like an aspect can impact a base program. We claim
that to handle advanced delegation rules, an ideal solution is to separate the
delegation rules from the access control policy, each being specified in isolation,
and then compose/weave them together to obtain a new access control policy
(called active security policy) reflecting the both access control and delegation.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, a complete model-driven framework has been pro-
posed to enable dynamic enforcement of delegation and access control policies
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Fig. 1. Overview of our Model-Driven Adaptive Delegation approach
that allows the automatic configuration of the system according to the changes
in delegation/access control rules. The enforcement of security policy to the tar-
get system is in fact the composition of security models with the target system
model. The dynamic adaptation of the running system is possible thanks to
the modern adaptive execution platforms like OSGi 1, Kevoree 2, which provide
low-level APIs to reconfigure a system at runtime.
3.4 Model-Based Security Testing
We focus on proposing a Model-Based Security Testing and Mutation Analysis
approach for the validation of the resulting secure system. From the security
model(s), we plan to automate the (partial) generation of security test cases.
Our goal of using mutation analysis is to derive a sufficient test set, which can
detect all the security faults denoted by the mutants. In that way the correct
secure system that can pass the sufficient test set will be obtained. We have
adopted mutation analysis for delegation policies [8]. Mutation analysis operates
by introducing artificial defects called mutants into the artifacts of the program
under investigation. Our approach in [8] consists of analyzing the representation
of the key components of delegation, based on which we derive the suggested
set of mutant operators. These operators can then be used to introduce mutants
1 www.osgi.org
2 www.kevoree.org
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into delegation policies and thus, enable mutation testing. There is still more
work to be done to validate our idea in [8].
Here we propose to use security testing because so far formal verification
methods for security still have limitations. Only some specific problem areas such
as smart-cards or cryptographic protocols are applicable for formal verification
methods. Formal verification is still unfeasible for larger systems due to increased
complexity and dependencies.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented our research work with its main modules and
track record. Regarding the first module which is literature review, we have
conducted a systematic literature review of MDS and a book chapter on advances
in MDS. This module is more or less done even though we are still working on
a journal version of the review. In the second module which is modeling of
security concerns, we have dealt with access control and delegation. But there
is still more work to be done for modeling multiple security concerns. The third
module focuses on composing models. We have proposed a framework for model-
driven adaptive delegation. Our model-driven framework needs to be improved
for handling multiple security concerns at the same time. And last but not least,
the fourth module is about security testing. Our work on testing delegation
policy enforcement via mutation analysis [8] is at the beginning. We will continue
working on that. In the end, we also would like to have an industrial case study
for evaluating our approach.
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